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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
ERNEST L. STALEY,

Respondent,
vs.

W. C. GRANT,

Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
1. That the decision of the District Court allowing
plaintiff damages aJS prayed for was. against the ~aw and
evidence in 'Said cas:e.
1

2. T1Iat the plaintiff wrus guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law and not entitled to recover
damages for his failure to keep a proper or any lookout
as he drove his automobile and approa0hed the intersection ·of State Street and 9th South Street, public
streetls in s·a.lt L·ake City, Utah, and that he failed to
keep ·a proper or ·any lo okout as he stopped at the north
curb line of s:a.id 'intersection and as he dr'Orve· his ·automo..
bile south through said intersection.
1

1

STATEMENT OF F·ACT
rr'h1a:t on ~he night of the 22nd day of Augus~t, 1952,
at about the hour of 10 :30 o'clock P.M. thereof, at the
1
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intersection of 9th South and State Stree t, public s-treets
in Salt Lake City, S'alt L'ake County, s.tate of Utah, the
defendant who rs the appellant and will be referred to
here·after as the defendant wrus driving his Hudson
' South Stre·et going fr om
automobile along and upon 9t!h
eirust to west and a;s he ap·proached the said intersection
he sto·pp:ed back of and behind a yeliow taxicab that \Vas
waiting for the semaphore to turn fron1 the red to the
green l'ight; that when the light changed to green he
followed the· yellow cab into the said inters.ootion going
we·st a.nJd 'the cab turned 'S'Oruth at about the center of
State Street hut before the defendant could turn and
follow him through and turn completely south, the traffic
imme·diately starte:d going from wes:t to east and it was
so heavy that it caus.e:d 'the defendant to stop and hold.up facing tl1e ·southwe'st approximately under the said
semaphore until said traffic had ceased and cleared and
it was safe for him to p·roc.eed on s.outh; that he started
up and was proceeding southward when he was hit by
plaintiff's car .. that was traveling south, in said intersection at said time and place.
1

1

1

That 'the plaintiff, who i's the respondent and will
be referred to h·ere:after ·a:s the p·laintiff, alleges that
he 'Stopped his ca.r at the northw·est si~de of the curbline of said inte.rse.ction in the lane next to the ce·nter
of State Street, and iliat he was driving one of three cars
that were stopp~e:d in said lane waiting for the semaphore
to turn fron1 red to the green light; that there was one
car i1nmediately in front and a car inunediately in back
of him; that when the light changed to green the three
2
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cars proceeded through the intersection going from north
to south. The first car, a Mercury, was ahead of plaintiff's ·car and was the first to go through; that plaintiff's
car reached the center of the said intersection or about
under the se1naphore when the defendant drove his car
from the ea1st going west against the red light and collided with plaintiff's car dan1aging the left front side thereof; that the rear end of plaintiff's car had been shoved to
the rsouthwe'st for about eight or ten feet with the front
end of s·aid ear remaining where it wa s when the ears
came together with the front end ·of defendant's car
right up against the front side of pl·aintiff''S car; that
there weTe no skid m·arks exce-pt those made by the rear
wheels of plaintiff's ear; that visibility was good; that
traffic was 'heavy at iliat hour; 'that the intersection was
dry and that the hea;dlights were in good working order,
and that plaintiff did not see defendant's car until the
instant uf the collision.
1

ARGUMENT
As to the vi1 si~on of the pl'aintiff: There may have
been a ear to the right of him, ye:s ( Tp. 15) ; that he did
not observe any other traffic except the C'ar ahe'ad of
him and that the intersection was. clear and tlrat he S'aw
nothing in the inteT'section at all, ( Tp. 15) ; that at the
moment of imp:act he saw the defendant and di'd nort
llave time to do anything until he was hit, (Tp. 16); that
he 'S'aw defendant'~s car five or six feet away; that he did
not know what drew his attention ·to it but he did see it
just before he was hit, (Tp. 20); that he saw the defendant'~s car at the same instant he was hit, (Tp. 23); that

3
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he di d not ·s·ee ·defendant's car leave the east side of the
interse·ct'ion an·d that plaintiff never saw defendant's car
on the East ·at anytime or at any place until the impact,
(Tp·. 25) :
1

Mr. llunsaker v.rho testifie'd for plaintiff testified
that both the plaintiff''S car (X2) ·and defendant's car
(XD) and the ear he was riding in (X3) and car (Xl)
were stopped at one and the same time, but that he diid
no1t 'See the ·defe·ndant's car approach .the intersection o~
e;ome to a rstop·, and if that irs the cas.e, defendant's car
w·as ·stop~ped an'd had been stopped on the go or green
light,-·an'd as unusu'al a:s this alleged conduct was,
n.either the plaintiff and the witness Davis, ~driver of car
(X3) s·aw it either stopp·e:d at the edge of t:he intersection or as it started up and slowley moved into the
interrse.ction, going from east to we.s.t, or as it pulled up
to the inter'section an'd stopped or at any time.
As to witness Davis: He te·stified that he was driving hrs car (X3) directly back of plaintiff's car (X2)
and that he did not ~see de.fendant''s car (XD) until the
time 'Of the collision; that he could not s~ay whether
defendant's ear was going from east to west to make a
left turn south or whether ,defendant's c'ar was in the
center of the said intersection stopped and partially
turrre d s:outh or m'Oving in that direction. However he
said defenldant's car wa,s making a left turn; that he did
not ·s.ee defendant's car parked or stoppe d at the northeas.t edge of the northerust curb lin·e of the intersection
and that he did not see the ear move or travel ·slowly into
the intersection going fron1 east to west; that his vision
1

1
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was clear and unobstructed; that he was driving car'efully, a.n'd that he was frank and honest enough to admit,
that if a car had been so n1oving at that time and pl'ace
as he entered the inter'secti!on and proceeded south he
would have seen it, Tp. 5-46-48-49).
Plaintiff's witness, Hunsaker, testified that defendant's car was ·stopped and then came through the red
light and hit the plain:tiff',s car in the center of the intersect~on. I think we have a right to a)ssume that when
the light turned green on the sem·aphore that the north
boun!d traffic ( Tp. 8-12-26-27-28) 'an'd the south boun1d
traffic started ·simultaneously to move acr'os:s the intersection in both directions; that if ·defendant's car entere d
the said inter;section a,s Hunsaker 'Says, shortly after hi's
car (X3) entered then the. plaintiff's car wHich preceeded
him was well into the intersection. That being the case,
with traffic being admittedly heavy, the north bound
traffic reached the center line at about the same time
car (XI) reached it and was passing the center line when
plaintiff's car arrived at the center. If that is a reasonable inference to be drawn from the facts, then how could
deefndant drive his car, starting from a dead start, out
in front of the north boun'd traffic and hit the plaintiff,
(Tp. 38-39). Hunsaker also says that he had no idea of
the relative speeds of the cars; then he said the defendant's ear was going fast for being in low gear, (Tp. 41).
How did he know it was in low gear~
1

There is nothing in the records to indicate tllat
either car 'vas going other than very ·slow and there is
nothing in the record inconsi·stent with defendant's testi-
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lllOny When he SaY'S he was in the centHr of the s·aid
intersection going ·southwest after ~stop·ping for traffic
going from west to east to clear · and that he started
up again going a little better than 'a 1nile ·an hour when
he was hit, or as the evidence 'Shows that p~iaintiff drove
into the front of defendant's car and that ·defendant was
going s:o ·slow that plantiff's car was shove-d and pushed
and that the front end of plaintiff'·s car did not mo;ve
from the point of imp·act.
It was at the center of the intersection when p~lain
tiff and the witne·s.s Davrs first 1S'aw the defendant's car
and Mr. D·avis ~said ·he was turned or was turning south
and the plaintiff ·als:o indicate:~ the same fact. There
is no dispute between the defendant, witness Davis and
the ·plaintiff as to defendant's car being in the center of
the intersection, because. 'that is.: where the· defendant
said he was and that is where the other two firs.t saw
him.
s.earch the record through and you will not find one
scintilla of evidence. to support the fact that there was
an element of ·surp.rise or shock in it, 'or anything whatsoever that shows or in:dieate·s or tends to show or indicate that the accrdent hap·pene d with ·such speed or suddenne,ss that the plaintiff was taken completely -off guard
and wa;s helpless to ·do ·anything abo~ut it. If there was
a sudden surpri'se it was because the plaintiff was not
driving with due care, caution and circumspection, and
beeause he faile•d to keep any or a proper lookout for
others that might be 1naking use of the streets, crossings
and intersecti'On's - an!d not ·because of any undue- speed
of either ·automobile.
1
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The court m-ade a finding that the plaintiff did not
see the defendant's car until it was within four feet of
plaintiff's ear. A car going five miles an hour travels
at the rate of seven feet per second, and if the :defendant
or plaintiff was traveling five miles an hour the ·plaintiff
saw him about a half 'Second before the collision. If ·a
car was going ten miles per hour it is traveling at the
rate of fifteen feet per secon d and if the ·defendant or
plaintiff was traveling that fast the plaintiff saw him a
little less than one third of a second before the impact.
The evidence and the court's finding based upon the
evidence makes it impossible for it to be otherwise then
that the impact between the two cars took place simultanously with plaintiff seeing defendant's car and that
is the only tune that he saw defendant's car.
1

I can hardly see, under all the facts and Clrcmnstances, h:ow reasonable minds coul!d differ as to the
rnatter of :defendant's car being seen by the plaintiff if he
had been keepmg a proper-lookout, or by anyone. else
who was about to enter the intersection from any direetion. That being the case how could the minds of re:asonable men differ as to the plaintiff being guilty of contributory negligence for not keeping a proper lookout. Under
all the evidence it is impossible to place the defendant's
car in any position at the edge of or in the intersection
\vhere it is not vi·sible at all times ha:d the p~aintiff been
half looking. Defendant satd that he ·drove his ear into
the in te r~ection on the green light and was turning to go
south on State Street, but because of the west-east traffic
that had the right of way, he was. force d to stop at the
1
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center of the intersection, partially turned to the south.
Is there any doubt that under those circumstances. that
his car should have been seen. If the ·defendant, as Mr.
Hunsaker testified drorve his ear in low gear into the
intersection on the' red light about the same time or
slightly after plaintiff'·s car had entered, then certainly
he shou~d have been seen; if nothing else, defendant's
erratic driving should have drawn plaintiff's attention to
him.
In the case of J ackson-vs-Cook, 181 So. 195, the
court had this to say:
"This makes it clear ·enough we think, that
we did not intend to, and did not, set the well
recognized and settled rule that the duty of those
in charge of motor cars and engines to look ahead
and observe never cease1s; that what they can see
they must see an~d in legal contemplation they do
see; that their failure to see what they could have
seen by the exercise of due diligence does not
absolve them from liability." * * * In Minor-vsStevens, 118 P313, the court sai!d: "If the plaintiff saw. the ·automobile before it struck her, or
by rea~sonable use of her senses could have seen
it in time to avoid the injury, she could not reeove:r.''
I have discussed with other l·awye~s the decisions
of this court relative to tl1e law on right of way, proper
lookout, p-resumptions that others will lawfully obey
the traffic rules arrd re·gula tions and other traffic difficultie:s, particularly at intersections, an'd I fin,d them
as equally confused a:s I an1 myself. I believe there is
an opinion of this court that takes a squint at the same
8
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thing. If that is true then a lawyer cannot advise a
client as to his traffic rights and responsibilities with
any degree of certainity, and he is left to pure speculation.
I have read 1nany and divers decisions of the appellant courts and you can find any and all kinds and
variations of complexions, sliadings, colorings and microscopic d~stinctions, an·d some with simple traffic problems being complicated and involved by so1ne seemingly
ponderous opinions that are intended to display a judge's
philosophy of an infinite variety of detail to the confusion of the lawyers and the trial courts. It is refreshing to run on to an opinion that is not confused by some
fancy and weighty thinking - that is simple, direct and
uil!derstandable; that conforms. to an old established rule
without trying to compromise or dilute it or water it
down because of a shading and d:Ustinction that is S 0
faint that you can hardly discern it. However, some
judges feel called upon to distinguish this kind of case
and they go far afield with a seemingly long, logical and
convincing opinion that woul d not hold up under the
scrutiny of a talented penetrating judicial mind.
1

1

The problen1s in this case is a very silnple one and
it asks this court whether or not a driver of a car ought
to or shoul~d see what there is to be seen if he is keeping
any or a proper lookout~ and if he is not keeping any
or a proper lookout whether he is guilty of contributory
negligence as a 1natter of law~ To 1ne, any court that
relaxes the rule of keeping a proper lookout, a.s exercised by a reasonable prudent man under the same or

9
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similar circu1nstances ' is _bO'uilty of creating a snare that
will have a tendency to lure pedestrians an:d motorists
to their da1nage, injury or death. Human nature and
1nechanical devises being what they are an~d as defective
and full of faults as tl1ey are, no one should be permitted
to assume or presume anything without seeing the object
upon which their assumption is based - if it is there to
be seen and can be seen with due diligence; that no
driver of an auto1nobile or pedestrian should be permitte1d to relax a proper lookout because he is favored
with a signal, light, sign or favored highway or for any
other reason, because he not only has his own safety to
look after but the safety of others that are using the
streets and highways. If he is to do that then he should
not be lulled into a sense of security by any legal or
traffic device or signal, human or n1echanical.
The doctrine of the traffic presump·tion is only a
subterfuge and an excuse for not keeping any or a prope·r
lookout an d it is the one way that the courts have of
excusing ·such contributory negligence. Then some of
1

the de cisions and opinions get into the very weighty and
1

deep proble1ns of "proximate cause" of the damage or
injury and they begin to speculate, guess and conjecture
as to whether it vvas due to not looking, or looking and
not seeing, or relying upon an unseen p.resumption that
didn't jell, and then they finally get to the point where
they are so confused about the driver who couldn't see
for looking and causing his auton1obile to co1ne into
contact with a car that vvas not there, and then they throw
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up their hands and say, this proximate cause business
is a question for the jury.
I do not want to be misunderstood, for I firmly believe that a driver is entitled to his presumption that
others will use the public streets lawfully and carefully,
but he is only permitted to indulge in the presumption if
he is free from negligence and keeping a proper lookout,
and he bases his presumption upon on what he sees and
nothing else.
It is only the untoward things that happen that
cause and bring about accidents whe-re negligence is
involved, and drivers of automobiles and pedHstrians
should be ever alert and vigilant to detect the unusual
and the untoward on the part of others so that accidents,
injuries an d property damage can be avoided and
averte'd. Everyone using the highways and public streets
owe that duty to .one another, and I do not believe that
it is good law for some decisions of our courts to allo~
or permit a dereliction of that duty by hiding it back of
the s:o called presumption.
1

1

I drive on the ·defensive as I and everyone else
should drive and if my thinking remains the same I
will rely upon my senses and particularly upon my vision
(eyes) rather than take a chance on making any presumptions no matter how appetizing the courts try to
make them - to make up the difference. I will feel
negligent indeed if I ever have to rely upon or substitute
a presumption for not looking and ke·eping a proper lookout, even with the court granting me that right.

11
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A little study .and son1e observations of human nature tell's you that you cannot put your trust in a p·resumption and the n1o1nent it is indicate:d that a presumption is wrong then you should do everything to avoid
damage and injury and render har1nles'S if possible the
mistakes, inadvertance and bad judgment of a fellow wayfarer. Driving is risky business and is risky enough without having some of our courts emu la.te Rip· Van Winkle
and set him up as a goo:d example under the ·doctrine of
the presmnption. You could say sleep p·eacefully on the
presumption will always attend you, .and you can always
get to a jury no matter how sound you sleep.
1

I think I have read most of t;he decisions of this
court dealing with inte·rsections and crossings that have
been written within the last twelve to fifteen years and
I have picked the following cases upon which I rest
the instant case: Bullock-vs-Luke, 98 P2 350; Farrellvs-Cameron, 94 P2 1068; Hickok-vs-Skinner, 190 P2 514
(over ruled) ; Conklin-vs- Walsh, 193 P2 437 and Glen-vsN orton 213 P2 556. The Bullock opinion was written in
1940, when we had less modern art .and music an'd very
little be-bopp; when intellectuals were few and Joe McCarthy was unheard of. It is a plain, short simple
opinion that even I can understan·d and so far as I am
conce-rned it holds that you cannot ·drive into an intersection without looking and seeing what there is to be
seen and should ·be seen and if you fail to so drive in
such a manner you are guilty of contributory negligence
as a 1natter of law. These eases were quoted in another
case and they 'vere distinguished and resolved very

12
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readily, but I do not find it as easy .as that and I must
confess that I have found it rather difficult to make the
distinctions, so hence my confusion. I might venture a
prediction and say that judging fron1 a few of the court's
decisions that have been written and if the trend continues the Bullock case will be over ruled.
1

The duty to keep a proper lookout applies as
well to the favored a.s to the disfavored. * * * The
duty of keeping a proper lookout attends all those
operating motor vehicles, and other rules of the
road ·do not relieve any driver of the necessity
of complying with this requirement, Conklin-vsWalsh, 193 P2 437. He is bound to look to the
left as well as to. the right for approaching
vehicles. If he has reason to think that because
of the other drivers negligence he will not be
accorded the right of way, it becomes his duty to
do what he can to avoid a collision, as by stopping
or turning aside, failure to do which is contributory negligence, 5 AJ 667, 21 ALR 988, 37 ALR
509, 47 ALR 613.
There is a volummous note to be found in 164 ALR
26, which makes a full and complete cove·rage of traffic
difficulties at intersections under any and all traffic
conditions and circumstances and you can find, if I do
not miss my guess, autho~rities to substantiate any point
of view or preconceived notion that one entertains
concerning intersection cases. Take your choice.
I sub1nit that the plaintiff was contributorily guilty
of negligence as a matter of law for not keeping any or
a proper lookout and failing to see what there was to
be seen and should have been seen .and could have seen
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if the plaintiff had been looking, and I feel, from an
examination of the- dec~sions of this court, that tliey
have confused the trial courts as to the 1natter of a p-roper
lookout.
Respectfully submitted

HORACE. C. BECK,
Attorney for Appellant
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